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This paper explores the neglected ‘harms-to-others’ which result from increased 
attention to beauty, increased engagement in beauty practices and rising minimal 
beauty standards. In the first half of the paper I consider the dominant discourse of 
beauty harms – that of ethics and policy – and argue that this discourse has over-
focused on the agency of, and possible harms to, recipients of beauty practices. I in-
troduce the feminist discourse which recognises a general harm to all women and 
points towards an alternative understanding; although it too focuses on engaging 
individuals. I argue over-focusing on harms to engaging individuals is somewhat sur-
prising especially in liberal contexts, as this harm can broadly be regarded as ‘self-
harm’ (done by individuals to themselves, or by others employed by individuals to 
do so). The focus on engaging individuals has resulted in the neglect of significant 
and pressing harms-to-others in theory, policy and practice. In the second half of 
the paper I turn to actual and emerging harms-to-others. I focus on three particular 
harms-to-others as examples of the breadth and depth of beauty harms: first, direct 
harm to providers; second, indirect but specific harm to those who are ‘abnormal’; 
and third, indirect and general harm to all. I conclude that, contrary to current dis-
courses, harms-to-others need to be taken into account to avoid biased and partial 
theorising and counter-productive policy-making. I advocate recasting beauty, in a 
parallel way to smoking, as a matter of public health rather than individual choice.
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1. INTroducTIoN
In this paper I explore the neglected harms of beauty. some potential harms of 
beauty are widely recognised as issues of concern and are matters of considerable 
debate but others are almost wholly neglected. Primarily policy-makers, ethicists and 
lawyers have focused on harms to engaging individuals; cosmetic surgery recipients 
and beauty practices users. I argue that harms arising from such practices can largely 
be classified as ‘self-harm’; assuming a very broad definition of self-harm is adopted. 
a broad definition of self-harm includes the practices that individuals do to them-
selves, and those which they employ others to do to them. on this definition the 
focus on engaging individuals rather than on harms-to-others is perplexing as, on 
standard liberal models, harms-to-others are considered more morally significant 
than harms to the self. Prohibiting self-harm is often considered troublingly paternal-
istic in liberal contexts and yet in the beauty debate attention has almost exclusively 
been on the harms to engaging individuals. My aim is to highlight and investigate this 
striking gap and to argue that this neglect is a significant failure of theory and policy. I 
argue that the increased valuing of appearance in a visual and virtual culture, coupled 
with rising engagement and a rise in what is required to meet minimal standards of 
beauty, is already harmful to others.1 Moreover, if current trends continue and ap-
pearance continues to matter more then harms which are currently nascent are likely 
to become prevalent. I suggest that beauty harms should be reframed as public health 
concerns.
In order to make this argument, in section 2, I outline two discourses in which 
the harms of beauty are currently discussed; those of ethics and policy and feminist 
political philosophy. I do this to justify my claim that such debates have primarily 
focused on engaging individuals; and to consider the connection the feminist debate 
makes between beauty practices and a collective harm to all women. In section 3 I 
turn to overt harms-to-others; to harms beyond those which fall on currently en-
1.  In the paper I assume that minimal beauty standards are rising. This is not a claim that all 
standards are everywhere the same, or that there have not been more demanding beauty standards 
historically, undoubtedly there have; footbinding being a classic example. rather it is a claim that 
as a global beauty ideal of thinness, firmness, smoothness and youth, emerges so globally minimal 
standards rise and are standardised and normalised (Widdows, forthcoming 2018).
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gaging individuals. I introduce a number of possible harms-to-others to indicate the 
breadth of potential beauty harms. In section 4 I consider three harms-to-others. Each 
of these harms is an example of a different type of beauty harm. I have selected these 
three harms in order to illustrate the range and extent of potential beauty harms and 
to show that in some cases clear harms are already being ignored and likely emerging 
harms are not being recognised and anticipated. accordingly there are harms already 
occurring or emerging which merit response. The three harms I explore are: First, the 
direct harm to providers of beauty practices; second, the indirect but specific harm 
to those who are ‘abnormal’ and can never conform to minimal standards of beauty; 
and third, the indirect and general harm to all. I conclude that, contrary to current 
discourses, the most widespread and significant current and likely harms of beauty 
are not harms to engaging individuals, but to others. accordingly theoretical work, as 
well as policy and practice recommendations, must pay attention to harms-to-others, 
as well as to engaging individuals, if they are to avoid advocating biased or counter-
productive conceptions, policies and practices.
2. sTaNdard BEauTy dIscoursEs
There are two separate discourses which have focused on the harms of beauty 
practices. The first is that of policy-makers, ethicists and lawyers, who have focused 
on the harms and risks to those who engage in beauty practices. The second is femi-
nist critiques of beauty practices as instances of gender injustice. The only exception 
to the dominant focus on the harms to engaging individuals has been in the ethics 
of non-human animals, where the testing of beauty products is an issue of concern.
2.1 Safety, information and consent
The first discourse is primarily about safety, governance, and professional duties 
with regard to invasive procedures. There is concern that recipients are electing to 
have procedures or engage in beauty practices which are unduly risky; carried out by 
practitioners who lack extensive training in the procedures they are administering in 
unregulated or under-regulated premises, using untested products and without ade-
quate information or sufficiently robust consent procedures. such worries are height-
ened by scandals and rising public concern. For instance, the Poly Implant Prosthese 
(PIP) scandal of 2010 arose when breast implants were made from silicone intended 
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for industrial rather than medical purposes (Keogh, 2012). similar scandals attach to 
non-surgical processes and there are constant horror stories about injectables and 
fillers; and complications include infection, lumpiness, blood vessel blockages, tissue 
death, allergic reactions, prolonged swelling and bruising and even blindness (Keogh, 
2013, 24). at the most routine end of the spectrum, there are worries about practices 
such as skin lightening and tanning; for example, the World Health organisation 
considers skin lightening a public health risk across parts of africa, asia and Latin 
america (WHo, 2011).
such scandals have led to numerous reports and recommendations, with partic-
ular attention being paid to the most risky practices, those of surgery and injectables. 
Most prominent in the uK is the department of Health’s ‘review of the regulation of 
cosmetic Interventions’ chaired by Bruce Keogh; often referred to just as ‘the Keogh 
review’ (Keogh, 2013). The Keogh review recommended changes in three areas: first, 
in provision, calling for safe products and skilled and responsible providers; second, 
in care, to ensure an informed and protected public; and third, in redress. While 
there has not been the legislative response Keogh recommended professional bodies 
have taken action. For example, the General Medical council introduced ‘Guidance 
for doctors who offer cosmetic Interventions’ which emphasized adequate training 
and experience, ensuring realistic expectations, responsible marketing and the im-
portance of doctors consenting patients in person (GMc, 2016). This was supple-
mented by The royal college of surgeons’ publication, ‘Professional standards for 
cosmetic surgery’, which provides detailed instructions on how to meet professional 
standards (rcs, 2016). In addition, in 2017 the royal college of surgeons launched a 
certification scheme for appropriately trained and experienced surgeons.2 The goals 
of such initiatives are to improve the safety of procedures and to ensure that poten-
tial recipients are fully informed and that best practice consent procedures are imple-
mented across the board. In particular, that recipients are fully informed of risks and 
possible complications overtime; that there are no financial inducements to pressure 
recipients into quick decisions; and that there is a no-penalty cooling off period.
such responses only go so far. They do not address concerns about surgeons 
who do not fall under the auspices of uK professional bodies: recipients travel abroad 
to access cheaper procedures and surgeons are flown in by cosmetic companies to do 
2.  Members of the public can search a specialist register; however while some cosmetic surgery 
providers only employ registered surgeons non-registered surgeons continue to practice. 
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multiple operations.3 Nor do they address the lack of regulation, governance and best 
practice of non-surgical procedures. For instance, while Botox requires a prescription 
in the uK, it can be bought from the internet, and dermal fillers are almost wholly un-
regulated. The Keogh review memorably puts it that “a person having a non-surgical 
cosmetic intervention has no more protection and redress than someone buying a 
ballpoint pen or a toothbrush” (Keogh, 2013, 5). The review continues:
“Dermal fillers are a particular cause for concern as anyone can set themselves up 
as a practitioner, with no requirement for knowledge, training or previous experi-
ence. Nor are there sufficient checks in place with regard to product quality – most 
dermal fillers have no more controls than a bottle of floor cleaner” (Keogh, 2013, 5).
In terms of harms to recipients the regulation of non-surgical treatments is a 
pressing area for policy makers to address. Non-surgical procedures are far less regu-
lated than surgical procedures and yet it is here where uptake is rising exponentially.4 
although figures should be used cautiously, that these procedures are increasingly 
commonplace is not contested; accurate data is notoriously lacking across beauty 
practices and there is no systematic recording of the numbers of surgical and non-
surgical procedures, outcomes, complications and side-effects.5 Part of ensuring that 
products and premises are safe and the practitioners are well-trained is about protect-
ing engaging individuals from harm-from-others. serious physical and psychological 
harm can result from both surgical and non-surgical procedures.6 some harms are 
3.  so called ‘fly-in-fly-out’ or ‘seagull’ surgeons are an increasing phenomenon and the primary 
reason for cosmetic surgery tourism is to attain cheaper treatments (Griffiths and Mullock, 2017).
4. There is no centralised reporting of the number of such procedures and therefore estimates of 
the numbers of procedures carried out in the uK or globally are impossible to attain. However, that 
there is a rise in Botox and other non-surgical but invasive procedures (such as fillers, non-surgical 
face lifts and chemical peels) is undoubtedly the case. all surveys, however incomplete, suggest that 
Botox rises year on year. For instance, the 2016 statistics for procedures carried out in the us de-
scribes Botox as the most popular non-surgical procedure with over 4.5 million procedures carried 
out by registered medics in 2016 (asaPs, 2016, 7).
5.  The lack of data, particularly extensive and robust data, is a constant complaint of policy-makers 
in the beauty context. The frustration is evident in the Keogh review which comments that, “there 
is no central collection of data on the complications following cosmetic interventions and hence no 
information on the type or frequency of complications” (Keogh, 2013, 39). This frustration is echoed 
in the Nuffield council on Bioethics report, The Ethics of Cosmetic Procedures (Nuffield, 2017).
6.  Physical harms include standard harms of surgery (including adverse reactions to anaesthesia, 
bleeding, scaring and risks of infection and complications) as well as added risks which attach to us-
ing implants (either from additional risks of infection and rejection or from harms from the some-
times toxic implants, especially when they rupture or leak). Psychological harms are more contested 
and some argue offset by psychological benefit, but possible psychological harms include increased 
attention to appearance leading to increased body image anxiety and its negative consequences. 
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foreseeable and intentional; for instance, that the recipients of PIP implants would be 
harmed was wholly foreseeable. This was a direct harm, and one the women did not 
do to themselves and which could not be classed as self-harm.
Protecting individuals from using unsafe products is part of protecting indi-
viduals from harm-from-others. Moreover, professional bodies are, by definition, 
concerned with regulating the profession, and the emphasis on safe products and 
procedures serves to protect the profession and the practitioners within it as well 
as engaging individuals. yet, assuming that providers are acting ethically, providing 
services and products in good faith and informing recipients of the risks, then both 
practitioners and recipients are protected, and harms to engaging individuals are ef-
fectively self-harm. For example, in cases where surgery goes wrong but no one has 
acted wrongly harms which arise are best understood as ‘self-harm’. If individuals 
are made aware of the risks—and there are always risks—and have fully consented 
then they are taking responsibility for bad outcomes which they know might occur. 
all surgery can have complications, even when performed by the best surgeon in the 
best setting. That recipients do take responsibility for bad outcomes when no one is 
at fault is borne out by the testimonies of women who engage.7 Whether or not this is 
ethical, and whether these decisions are really as free as the consent model assumes is 
something I debate elsewhere (Widdows, forthcoming 2018). However, on the liberal 
model where individuals are permitted to engage in harmful and risky practices as 
long as they are fully informed, weigh the risks and benefits, and formally consent 
such harms are, rightly or wrongly, placed at the door of the consenting individual. 
accordingly harms which befall engaging individuals can be classified in some very 
broad sense as ‘self-harm’.
If such harm is self-harm, then the lack of attention paid to harms-to-others is 
perplexing. one possible explanation for focusing only on those engaging rather 
than others is the difficulty of tracking harm-to-others. collecting comprehensive 
data on the harms to those who engage in practices may be challenging, and cur-
rently lacking, but collecting data on those who do not engage is more challenging. 
This is particularly true when we consider indirect harm, where there is no causal 
link between an action and a harmful outcome. While direct harm to others (such as 
that to providers which will be considered in section 4.1) is possible to evidence in a 
similar way to direct harm to recipients, indirect or communal harms, for instance, 
7.  For example ‘Betty’, a cosmetic surgery recipient, voices this, when she says that having had 
surgery “you have to stand behind the decision” (davis, 1995, 145).
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harms resulting from changing social norms and expectations, is far more difficult 
to track and document. Evidence of general or communal harms is never causal, but 
requires the tracking of patterns, trends and correlations and making informed, but 
always interpretive, deductions from data. Given this, claims of general, communal 
and group harm are harder to substantiate and are not definitive in the way which 
causal harm to engaging individuals is; although the harms are directly experienced 
by individuals in that it is individuals who feel the pressure to conform to more de-
manding beauty ideals and social norms. Evidencing this harm is far more complex 
than evidencing the harms of physical disfiguration or pain. The operation or proce-
dure is the cause of physical disfigurement or pain; by contrast what is the cause of in-
creased body-dissatisfaction? To be sure feeling increased pressure to engage in more 
beauty practices correlates with the increased use and normalisation of practices, but 
the exact nature of the relationship is indeterminate. Therefore, despite the signifi-
cant damage done to very many, it may be that the lack of direct causal evidence is 
sufficient for policy makers to shy away from recognising and addressing such harms.
2.2 Inequality, inferiority and gendered harm
The second discourse about the harms of beauty practices is found in feminist 
political philosophy. at first glance this discourse appears to be wholly distinct from 
the discourse in medical ethics, law and policy. However, on investigation, it too tends 
to focus on the harms to women who engage but, and importantly for this paper, the 
feminist discourse also highlights communal or general harm to all woman.
This type of argument originates with radical second-wave feminist think-
ers such as andrea dworkin. dworkin introduces footbinding as an extreme but 
typical beauty practice. It serves to sexualise, physically constrain and physically hurt 
women; it establishes women “as ornaments, as sexual playthings, as sexual con-
structs” (dworkin, 1974, 106). dworkin argues that beauty practices in general serve 
this function: they make women ‘women’, by showing women are different from and 
subservient to men. Moreover, that they are painful is not accidental, but “teaches 
an important lesson: no price is too great, no process too repulsive, no operation 
too painful for the women who would be beautiful” (dworkin, 1974, 115). The use of 
beauty practices to make women ‘women’ and to transform them into stereotypically 
sexual objects, such feminists argue, is harmful and costly for individual women, and 
harmful to all women.
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clare chambers makes a similar argument, but within a liberal framework and 
using language which is more familiar to current debates. she argues that engage-
ment in beauty practices, such as elective breast augmentation, is harmful because it 
compromises the core liberal value of equality. For chambers, individual women are 
harmed as a result of conforming to patriarchal norms. While an individual woman’s 
choice to engage may be free from the desires of any actual man, it is not, and cannot 
be, free from the constraint of patriarchal norms. To illustrate, she compares breast 
implants and knee implants highlighting their cultural meaning:
“Why on earth would anyone want to have surgery to insert heavy and dangerous 
alien objects into her body if there were not social meaning to, or social payoff from, 
the practice? A woman who did want to have breast implants in such a society 
would be like someone who wanted to have cosmetic knee implants” (Chambers, 
2008, 40).
chambers argues that it is rational for women to choose to engage in beauty 
practices, but only because of the unjust context. In her analysis individual women 
are harmed by engaging in risky, costly and painful practices in order to conform 
to discriminatory and harmful social norms. she questions whether even the most 
informed of consents could be truly agentic as “gender inequality is so deeply en-
trenched in social norms that individual free choice cannot overcome it” (chambers, 
2008, 8).8 However, for this paper what is important to note is that the feminist 
debate—like the policy and ethics debate—focuses on harms to engaging individu-
als. The ethics, law and policy debate seeks to limit harm to engaging individuals by 
enhancing agency. For example, the reason emphasis is placed on improving consent 
processes because it is assumed that individuals who have information can make au-
tonomous and robust decisions. By contrast, the feminist debate is concerned that 
such decisions, which benefit men rather than women, can never be free (Jeffreys, 
2005, 32). despite these differences the focus for both is on engaging individuals.
However, the feminist debate, while focusing on engaging individuals, high-
8.  Jessica Laimann is more optimistic about informed consent from a feminist perspective and 
suggests that: “In addition to education campaigns that raise general awareness of the discriminatory 
and objectifying nature of the practice of breast implants, the relevant information could be specifi-
cally communicated as part of the physician-patient-consultation, or on the medical consent form 
that patients are required to sign before breast implant surgery. The relevant information would not 
only include reference to the status harm that having breast implants might entail, but could also 
feature information about the harm effects breast implants might have on other women by increasing 
acceptance and influence of the relevant norm” (Laimann, 2015, 56). 
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lights one important harm-to-others; the general harm or communal harm which all 
women suffer. To return to chambers, she argues that “the problem with disciplin-
ary appearance norms is not just that they are different for men and women, and not 
just that they are more exacting and expensive (in both time and money) for women, 
but that their effect is to cast women as inferior” (chambers, 2008, 29). This then is 
a general, communal or group harm which falls on all women; all women are being 
marked as inferior and unequal. It is a status harm. For chambers, on liberal grounds, 
states should intervene as “liberal institutions ought to ensure that, wherever pos-
sible, pressures to make disadvantageous choices should not fall on a specific group 
or groups” (chambers, 2008, 130). Her claim is that choices which are systematically 
made by one group and not another suggest disadvantage, and choices which are 
responses to identifiable pressures suggest undue influence. Both systematic influ-
ence and/or disadvantage are indications of injustice.9 In chambers argument, as in 
dworkin’s before her, it matters that the requirements of beauty are unequal; that 
they fall on women and not men. as sandra Bartky memorably puts it, “soap and 
water, a shave and routine attention to hygiene may be enough for him; for her they 
are not” (Bartky, 1990, 71). The asymmetry or inequality marks women’s status as in-
ferior and unequal and permits gendered exploitation and/or subordination.
What I wish to take from this debate is not the gendered nature of beauty 
harms—an argument I critique elsewhere10—but rather the recognition that there 
might be general and communal harms to all which attach to beauty practices and 
norms. The status harm falls on all women; irrespective of whether they engage or 
not. This claim, that social communal norms can be harmful—and to many, perhaps 
all—is a key argument, and a model upon which I draw. social norms, in the feminist 
discourse, can harm: they can impose limitations on what it is possible for individuals 
to be and do. I will return to communal harms of this broad type in section 4.3.
9.  chambers identifies two key indicators of injustice, the ‘disadvantage factor’ (choosers are 
harmed compared to those who choose differently) and the ‘influence factor’ (identifiable pressures 
on choosers from the group who choose differently and benefit) (chambers, 2008, 120).
10.  I argue at length that while there are significant and troubling gendered harms of beauty, for 
instance from hyper-sexualised norms, it is less possible to claim that engagement continues to be a 
gendered harm as the minimal demands of beauty become increasingly burdensome for men (Wid-
dows, 2017).
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3. NEGLEcTEd HarMs-To-oTHErs
In the last section I claimed that the dominant discourse about the ethics of 
beauty practices is overwhelmingly focused on and concerned with harms to engag-
ing individuals. This is also the case for the second discourse of feminist political phi-
losophy, although some attention is also paid to the communal and general harm to 
women as a group. That the medical ethics discourse is so focused is perhaps not sur-
prising. The concern of medical professionals is not to question wider social norms 
but to do their best for their particular patient within current frameworks. Nor is it 
surprising that they assume, despite the numerous critiques, that informed consent 
protects from harm, as this is a standard assumption in medical practice.11 yet policy-
makers cannot appeal to the same defence. It is exactly the task of policy-makers to 
consider harms across their jurisdictions and to recognise the interaction of practices, 
policies and norms. The task of policy-makers, considered broadly, is to put in place 
governance frameworks which leave individuals space to live the lives they choose 
as long as they do not harm or unduly proscribe the freedom of others. some, even 
liberal, models go further and argue that policy-makers should seek to provide equal-
ity of opportunity or conditions of human flourishing for those in their jurisdictions. 
But, endorsing these stronger claims is not necessary to claim that policy-makers 
should regulate to protect others from harm and/or prevent the undue restriction of 
others’ freedom. It is exactly the harms-to-others and restriction of others’ freedom 
deriving from increased attention to and engagement with beauty practices which is 
currently neglected.
While harms to individuals who engage are important and by no means yet fully 
addressed the harms of beauty are not limited to those which beset engaging indi-
viduals. To accurately consider the harms of beauty a broader frame is required, one 
which can recognise the harms-to-others which result from increasing engagement 
with beauty practices and the knock on effects of such engagement as engagement 
is normalised and minimal standards rise. such harms fall not only on those who 
choose to engage in beauty practices but on those who do not engage, or who only 
engage enough to meet minimal standards of beauty, to be ‘good enough’.12 There 
11.  For instance, Neil Manson and onora o’Neill argue that consent should not be regarded as 
protecting autonomy, but rather as a means to waive certain rights (Manson and o’Neill, 2007).
12.  For discussion on the ethical similarity and dissimilarity between the explanatory and justify-
ing narratives for engagement of ‘to be normal’, ‘to be good enough’, ‘to be better’ and ‘to be perfect’, 
see last section of chapter 5, “Perfectly Normal”, of Perfect Me (Widdows, forthcoming 2018).
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are numerous possible —direct, indirect, individual, group, communal and general— 
harms which might attach to the rising demands of beauty.13 In section 4 I will focus 
on three distinct, actual or likely, harms-to-others which follow from increased en-
gagement with beauty practices. However, these harms are by no means exhaustive 
of harms-to-others which attach to beauty practices considered broadly, but rather 
they have been selected to exemplify different types of harm and so show the range 
and extent of possible beauty harms. other harms-to-others I could have considered 
are very general harms of discrimination, harms of unequal distribution of beauty, 
intergenerational harms, gendered harms from hyper-sexualised beauty norms, and 
harms to particular racial or ethnic groups. Before I detail three specific harms, let me 
briefly comment on discrimination and the potential distributive justice harms, as 
these are increasingly discussed in certain quarters and are indicative of the breadth 
of possible beauty harms.
appearance discrimination, ‘lookism’, has been increasingly discussed and has 
been compared with sexism and racism (Etcoff, 1999; swami and Furnham, 2008). 
appearance discrimination is a broad category which encompasses a number of pos-
sible harms. For example, in some forms it could be considered a general communal 
harm in that a society which discriminates on appearance grounds creates a toxic 
environment in which appearance matters more than other goods (a parallel claim 
is made in normalisation arguments).14 alternatively appearance discrimination can 
be considered group harm; limited to a specific group which is singled out and dis-
criminated against on appearance grounds. Finally—and this is the focus of much 
of the emerging literature—appearance discrimination can be an individual harm; 
experienced by individuals who are denied employment or other goods on appear-
ance grounds.
When it comes to individual harm the evidence is contested with regard to the 
extent to which appearance impacts upon employment and other opportunities. 
Evidence suggests that there is a small but clear advantage to good looks and a small 
but clear disadvantage to being classed as unattractive; and such advantages and 
13.  In this paper I do not distinguish in detail between different types of general, communal and 
group harms. The reason for this is that my aim is to show that harms beyond engaging individuals 
must be recognised, hence the purpose is to show that all of these non-individual harms are impor-
tant, rather than to distinguish between them.
14.  This argument underpins the claims in sections 4.3 that rising minimal standards impact on all. 
For a detailed account of the process of normalisation see chapter 5 of Perfect Me, “Perfectly Normal” 
(Widdows, forthcoming 2018)
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disadvantages apply across domains.15 yet some argue that such advantages are over-
estimated, and are outweighed by the harms which attach to over-valuing appear-
ance: particularly with regard to self-esteem (which has significant knock on effects 
for confidence and activity in other areas).16 Given the current lack of consensus, 
laws to prevent lookism may be premature: the evidence is contested and legislation 
might further embed a view that appearance is important and be counter-produc-
tive. Moreover, some claim that anti-discrimination laws would be unworkable as it 
would be difficult to determine those who could be classed as ‘unattractive’ and thus 
be subject to such discrimination.17 In addition, once appearance discrimination was 
illegal, employers would be unlikely to give appearance as a reason for not appoint-
ing, making appearance discrimination particularly hard to prove.
Nonetheless if appearance continues to become ever more valuable and valued 
in a visual and virtual culture then calls to extend discrimination laws to appearance 
may increase. Moreover even if legislation on discrimination grounds is not appropri-
ate other beauty harms may require mitigation or redress. For instance, if beauty is 
regarded as an important good—relevantly similar to health or education—then the 
distribution of beauty, opportunities to access beauty, or compensation for a lack of 
beauty, are issues of distributive justice. Beauty is already functioning as such a good 
in some contexts. For example, women report having surgery in order to ensure con-
tinued employment, and professional longevity is increasingly a reason for beauty 
engagement (Gimlin, 2012). Moreover, some go as far as to argue for a ‘right to beauty’; 
a dominant discourse in Brazil where cosmetic surgery, plástica, is widely available in 
public hospitals (Edmonds, 2007; 2010). In this context Ivo Pitanguy, a famous plastic 
surgeon, has asserted that “the poor have a right to be beautiful too” (Edmonds, 2010, 
15.  For instance, daniel Hamermesh, draws on numerous studies to show that when it comes to 
earnings there is a ‘beauty premium’ and an ‘ugly penalty’ of approximately 15% (Hamermesh, 2011, 
46). similarly in other domains; the more attractive are more likely to marry (Etcoff, 2011, 65) and to 
be assumed to have positive personality traits, such as friendliness, competence and intelligence 
(Eagly et al., 1991).
16.  For example, those who are considered beautiful may experience anxiety and insecurity as a 
result of heavy investment in their looks (Vantarian, 2009). 
17.  Most problematic is who would be protected. William corbett suggests that because there is 
not a clearly identified group deciding who would be covered by such legislation would likely domi-
nate any litigation (corbett, 2007). Moreover, daniel Hamermesh points out that obesity discrimi-
nation cases have been brought on the grounds that obesity is a disability (Hamermesh, 2011, 155). 
For obvious reasons bringing cases on disability rather than lookist grounds might be preferable for 
plaintiffs.
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14).18 While the argument in Brazil for a ‘right to beauty’ is very contextual and con-
nected to wider issues (not least as Brazil’s position as a hub for training many of the 
world’s cosmetic surgeons (Edmonds, 2010, 93)), if it is the case that beauty is a signifi-
cant enabling good, then a lack of beauty, or a lack of access to beauty, is an instance 
of injustice.
I raise the harms of discrimination and unjust distribution of goods or oppor-
tunity, not to draw conclusions (not least as the extent of the harms attached are 
contested and indeterminate) but to show the possible extent of the harms that might 
attach to beauty. The harms I wish to focus on in detail in the next section are less 
contested and more determinant. The harms have been selected to illustrate differ-
ent types of harm which might attach to beauty; to suggest that different harms fall 
on different groups, in different ways with various impact; and to show the possible 
extent of such harms. Thus I seek to highlight both the breadth and depth of poten-
tial beauty harms. To this end, I focus on one direct and two indirect harms which 
are already occurring, emerging and probable. The direct harm is to easily identifiable 
others; the indirect harm is in one case to identifiable others and in the other it is a 
general or communal harm which potentially affects all.
4. THrEE BEauTy HarMs-To-oTHErs
4.1 Direct harm to providers
as discussed in section 2 the ethics of beauty practices has largely been con-
cerned with the medical or pseudo-medical practices of cosmetic surgery and the 
duties of medical professionals. But, while there has been significant attention to the 
harms to recipients, there has been very little attention on harms to providers. Given 
that this is a direct harm, where evidence and causal data should not be difficult to 
find, this omission is particularly glaring.
Harms to providers tend to be in non-medical settings. Very many beauty 
practices (including invasive practices) are not carried out in medical settings or by 
18.  arguments for a ‘right to beauty’ in Brazil are taking place in a very distinct discourse in which 
surgery is regarded as treating the mind and addressing multiple needs, and where surgeons believe 
that “plástica is a form of ‘public health’ to which the poor should have access” (Edmonds, 2007, 367). 
Given the ‘right to beauty’ is being asserted in a context where human rights are generally hard to ac-
cess and there is little social mobility it may be that this discourse serves other purposes and provides 
“a popular form of hope” (Edmonds, 2007, 378) or an “imaginary vehicle of ascent” (Edmonds, 2010, 
20) when other opportunities are lacking. 
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medical professionals. If we think, as I argue we should, that cosmetic surgery is 
better conceived of as a beauty practice rather than a medical practice then we can 
posit a continuum of beauty practices. at one end of the continuum is minimal 
grooming (practices such as hair-styling and the routine and often daily application 
of lotions and potions) at the other end is the most risky type of beauty practice, that 
of surgery (recognising that surgery too is on a continuum; some is routine, frequent, 
with quick recovery times and low complication rates and some is complex, novel, 
has long recovery times and high risks of complication).19 conceptualised in this way 
there is no clear line between procedures which are routine beauty practices, invasive 
or surgical, nor is there a clear line between who carries out what practices in what 
settings.20 The middle of the continuum is particularly opaque and very many beauty 
practices are not provided by highly trained, privileged and protected medical pro-
fessionals. Even when they are carried out by medical professionals the professional 
in question may not have training in the specific procedure.21 some beauty practices 
carry little risk, either to the recipient or to the provider, and others are highly risky 
to either the recipient or the provider. However while there is significant work on the 
harms to recipients there is little on the risks to providers of procedures.22
The first direct harm to others is to providers who work largely in non-medical 
settings at the less-invasive end of the beauty practice continuum; hairdressers, nail 
technicians and beauticians. Beauty practitioners are not highly skilled, or at least 
their skill-base is not regarded as ‘expert’ in a way which is equivalent to or approxi-
mates with the medical professionals’ skill base; although in many instances signifi-
cant training and accreditation is required to use particular lines of products or equip-
ment. Beauty practitioners are much less likely to be regarded as professionals than 
medics and are classed as low-end service-providers; similar to retail workers they are 
19.  Breast implants are now relatively routine with low complication rates (BaPPs, 2008). By con-
trast buttock lifts are far more risky (Widdows, forthcoming 2018). Moreover, some fairly frequently 
carried out surgeries, have startling high risks of serious complications. For example, as many as a 
quarter of those who have abdominoplasties (tummy tucks) require further surgery (stewart et al., 
2006).
20.  For example, fillers could be carried out at home, in a salon or in a medical setting.
21.  Non-surgical procedures promoted as being carried out by medical professionals may be done 
by dentists or GPs rather than experts in cosmetic work, likewise surgeons may not be specialised or 
experienced in the surgeries they are undertaking.
22.  Glen Jankowski makes a parallel argument with regard to fashion. He argues that while there 
has been lots of attention on the need of the fashion industry to address the rise in body image wor-
ries by using more diverse models and images, there has been very little attention to the injustices 
perpetrated on those who work in the 250 million sweatshops providing the clothes of the fashion 
industry (Jankowski, 2016).
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regarded as selling a product and a service. They are not generally regarded as part 
of the professional classes. This is significant with regard to the power dynamics of 
the relationship between provider and recipient. The cosmetic surgeon is powerful, 
can suggest, explain, delimit and ultimately refuse to provide surgery. By contrast 
the beauty practitioner is expected to deliver what the client wishes, and while they 
can advise and suggest, ultimately it is the client’s wishes which largely prevail. The 
power rests with the consumer, the providers’ role is to meet the recipients’ desires, 
making it hard for providers to control what they do; including the extent to which 
they work with and administer risky products.23 There are of course exceptions and 
counter examples; celebrity hair-dressers are in high demand and they can charge 
significant amounts of money and dictate their clients’ hairstyles. Likewise, surgeons 
can be in vulnerable positions (for example, surgeons from lower-income countries, 
contracted to cosmetic surgery companies who fly them in to perform a series of op-
erations in a short period of time).24 In such scenarios the surgeons do not meet with 
recipients in advance and therefore have little control over who they operate on or 
the operations they do. Moreover, even the most expert and professional surgeon 
might feel under pressure to deliver, or try to deliver, what the recipient asks for.25 
a frequent comment from cosmetic surgeons is that if they do not agree to operate 
the recipient will simply find another surgeon who will operate; and the implication 
is that this would be worse for the recipient. This said, for the most part, those who 
work as beauty professionals at the more routine, less medicalised, end of the spec-
trum have less power relative to the recipient, less control about what they deliver to 
a particular client, and less social and economic capital. Given the relatively low value 
placed on such beauty work, such workers often find themselves in highly competi-
tive environments, vulnerable to being priced out of the market or replaced, espe-
cially given the relatively low barriers to entering the profession. as such they are 
low-paid and low-status workers vulnerable to exploitation. They are unable to ask 
for, or to provide for themselves, better pay and less harmful and risky working con-
23.  debra Gimlin captures this difference between surgeons as powerful service providers, whose 
judgements are regarded as expert and who chose what they will and will not do, and hairdressers 
who seek to advise but are not treated as experts and ultimately do what the client wishes (Gimlin, 
2002). 
24.  The so called ‘seagull surgeons’ discussed in footnote 3.
25.  The narrative of seeking to provide what the recipient wants and yet being aware that some of 
those who seek cosmetic surgery and/or beauty interventions are looking for impossible transforma-
tions, is a prevalent discourse of both surgeons and beauticians. This arguably adds a further emo-
tional pressure on providers.
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ditions if they wish to keep their jobs or remain competitive. To illustrate, consider 
the harms which are regularly suffered by nail technicians.
Nail technicians suffer physical harm from working with toxic chemicals on a 
daily basis and from inhaling the dust produced by filing acrylic nails. The New York 
Times ran an expose of the conditions of nail technicians working in New york in 
the summer of 2015 (Nir, 2015a; Nir 2015b). These articles documented the experience 
of the women who work in nail bars and their experiences of illnesses caused by the 
chemicals and materials involved in providing acrylic nails and gel polish. The harms 
which the women reported either experiencing or being aware of included miscar-
riage, cancers, skin irritations and respiratory problems. They also reported that chil-
dren are frequently born with health issues and learning difficulties. of course such 
reports are not evidence-based. These conditions, which women either experienced 
or knew women who had experienced, were not verified, nor could their causes be 
directly equated to their working conditions (at least not without further research). 
However, “some of the chemicals in nail products are known to cause cancer; others 
have been linked to abnormal fetal development, miscarriages and other harm to re-
productive health” (Nir 2005b), making this work prima facie risky. such harms are 
not limited to nail technicians and there is evidence to suggest that hairdressers also 
run risks from frequent exposure to toxic chemicals (Takkouche, 2009).
The harm to providers of engagement in at least some beauty practices is direct 
and rarely mentioned. There are numerous reasons for this. Not least, the focus on 
cosmetic surgery in isolation from other beauty practices, means that often the pro-
viders are assumed to be relatively powerful and privileged surgeons; although less 
privileged medical professionals such as nurses are key deliverers of non-surgical 
practices. For obvious reasons surgeons are far less vulnerable to harm than hair-
dressers or nail technicians who come from poorer and more vulnerable demograph-
ics. yet the harms to providers are direct and almost wholly missing from discussions 
about the consequences of the increasing value placed on appearance, the increased 
engagement in beauty practices, and the rise of minimal standards of beauty. If mani-
cured nails become, as hair dye already is, part of the minimal requirement of beauty 
then the numbers of those being directly harmed will dramatically increase, as will 
the need for urgent action to address such direct harm.
4.2 Indirect, specific harms to those who are ‘abnormal’
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The second harm to others is indirect, but falls on a particular group of identifi-
able individuals; although exactly who falls into this group is open to discussion. 
The group in question is those who do not, and cannot conform to minimal beauty 
norms. This group is made up of individuals who fall significantly outside what is 
considered to be ‘normal’, or ‘just good enough’ when it comes to meeting beauty 
ideals. Those in this group obviously fail to meet beauty standards and in ways which 
will not be experienced by most individuals. For instance, they are not failing to 
measure up because they are old, overweight or hairy (all of which might be failing 
to meet appearance standards, but either in ways which can be addressed or in ways 
which are commonly, ‘normally’, experienced). Those in this group obviously, un-
controversially and perhaps permanently fall outside the normal range. Those in this 
group a can be termed ‘abnormal’. I use the terms normal and abnormal reluctantly 
but knowingly and deliberately as if they are clear categories. My reason for doing so 
is to highlight the significance of the potential harm, and to show the serious nature 
of the risks which attach to the narrowing of normal in a context where appearance 
is increasingly valued.
Those who fall into the abnormal group are those who are disfigured at birth 
or by accident or have physical features which fall dramatically outside the normal 
range. What matters is that for this group there is no possibility of attaining minimal 
standards of normal and this is obviously and strikingly the case. To put it simply the 
individuals who fall in this group are clearly abnormal to the observer in a way which 
means that they fail to meet at least some aspect of minimal beauty norms; although 
they may, of course, meet other features of beauty norms.26 My claim is that those 
who fall a long way outside the normal range will become more visible—and so more 
vulnerable—as beauty becomes more important and as minimal standards of beauty 
rise. as we ‘fix’ what can be fixed, the gap between what is normal and what is abnor-
mal grows and the widening of this gap may harm those who fall into the abnormal 
category. The harms which such a group might suffer, taken broadly and indicatively, 
are: harms with regard to self-conception and identity (including lower self-esteem 
and increased feelings of shame and anxiety); harms of increased stigma and discrim-
ination; and harms of exclusion. as appearance increasingly matters for presentation 
and communication in an increasingly visual and virtual world social exclusion is 
26.  For example, smooth and unblemished skin may be attainable for an individual who cannot at-
tain beauty norms of thinness and height and conversely someone with disfigured skin (for example 
as a result of acid attack) may attain thinness, and so on. 
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a real risk for those who cannot meet the appearance norms of the digital world or 
who are uncomfortable with communication which is primarily image- rather than 
text-based. Indeed, as participation in, and being ‘liked’ on virtual image-based plat-
forms grow, meeting appearance thresholds might become an effective precondition 
of social interaction.
Both of these claims—first that this group will be more different and visible and 
second that they will be harmed as a result of increased difference and visibility—
are open to critique, and in part empirical critique. In this paper it is not possible to 
definitively claim that this group are (or will be) harmed by increasing minimal stan-
dards of beauty, but it is possible to argue for their increased visibility and to suggest 
that this makes harm a real and reasonable possibility. To be clear, the widening of 
the gap between normal and abnormal does not necessarily result in harm, but it does 
make it possible for harm to occur in comparison to a scenario where the gap between 
what is normal and abnormal is narrower or indecipherable or where measuring up to 
normal appearance ideas is not regarded as socially or culturally valuable. I will con-
sider first the narrowing of normal and extending the distance between normal and 
abnormal and second why this might result in harm for this group.
First, the narrowing of normal. That more is required to attain minimal stan-
dards of beauty, to be ‘good enough’ or to ‘be normal’ is an argument I make in depth 
and at some length elsewhere. In brief I argue that increasingly more is required of 
more of us to attain minimal standards of beauty and that this is happening incre-
mentally and in some instances what is required to meet minimal standards has risen 
dramatically over a short period of time and with little critique.27 Examples at the 
routine end of the spectrum include body-hair removal, where in a generation visible 
body hair has gone from acceptable—and even sexy—to unacceptable and shameful. 
another practice which was once occasional or optional but is now required to meet 
minimal standards of beauty (particularly for women, but increasingly for men) is 
hair dye; most women over a certain age, dye their hair. Further, the increase in nail 
bars suggests that manicures might be the next practice to tip into the required cat-
egory.28 In some contexts and among some demographics minimal standards go well 
beyond these. already, in some circles Botox and fillers fall into the required category 
and it is the untreated and aging face which is abnormal (Kay, 2015). Moreover, while 
27.  I argue that this is globally the case and that this matters for the normalising claim as there are 
less competitor norms (Widdows, forthcoming 2018). 
28.  I make this argument in detail in chapter 4, “routine maintenance, Treats and Extremes”, of 
Perfect Me (Widdows, forthcoming 2018). 
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cosmetic surgery is still exceptional in most groups and contexts it is increasingly 
desired and normalised.
The gradual escalation of minimal standards, coupled with increased pressure 
to engage beyond what is minimal and towards what is maximal, results in a narrow-
ing of the normal range. as those who can engage to attain ever more demanding 
minimal standards the group I am concerned with become increasingly differenti-
ated from the norm; more visible and more different. In addition, those in this group 
may also become rarer, again making them more visible. as those things which can 
be ‘fixed’ are fixed in order to attain as near an approximation to normal as possible 
those who cannot be ‘fixed’ stand out more. There are numerous examples of ‘fixing’ 
features routinely, often for supposed health reasons, even though health function-
ing is not affected. To illustrate, sticky-out ears are routinely ‘pinned back’ for appear-
ance reasons even though hearing and other health functioning is not affected, like-
wise birthmarks and other disfigurements are removed. similarly, if affordable, teeth 
are routinely straightened, and while some of this work is for functioning reasons, for 
instance, to reduce overbite or/and to reduce plaque build-up, much teeth straight-
ening is for appearance reasons.
In addition to fixing abnormalities, it is also increasingly the case that appear-
ance is regarded as a reason for pre-natal selection (whether by Pre-Implantation 
Genetic diagnosis or pre-natal testing followed by termination). For instance, while 
the numbers of abortions to avoid a child with a cleft lip or palate are small (McHale 
and Jones, 2012), and smaller than the hype would have us believe, such terminations 
do occur and presumably the reasons for such choices are appearance based. While 
the functioning of a cleft palate or lip can usually be corrected by surgery often the 
tell-tale signs remain. such features are disfigurements and as appearance matters 
more they are becoming regarded as significant; and significant enough to justify se-
lection against. This suggests that appearance is a factor in decisions about selection 
and perhaps to the extent where a flawed appearance, irrespective of functioning, is 
regarded as a significant impartment. selection on appearance grounds is likely to 
extend, for example, it has been claimed that were the technology available 11 percent 
of couples would abort a foetus predisposed to obesity (rhode, 2010, 26). I do not 
wish to enter discussions about whether or not those who are selected against are 
harmed, but I do wish to argue that increased selection makes those in the abnormal 
category rarer, more visible and as a result makes them more open to harm. In addi-
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tion such judgements contribute to the belief that appearance is highly valuable and 
accordingly that failure to succeed in attaining beauty goods is significant.
Given these trends it is not unreasonable to think that those who fall outside 
the normal range will indeed become rarer and as a consequence more visible. yet 
being visible or rare, even to the point of abnormality, is not necessarily a harm, 
which brings me to the second argument. To argue that such individuals are, or will 
be, more open to being harmed requires an additional, and more difficult, argument. 
It requires empirical evidence which is simply not available with regard to current 
harm. However, while the evidence is not yet sufficient to prove assertions of current 
harm, that harms are possible, perhaps likely, is sufficient reason for policy makers 
to be alert to the possibility and to seek to establish whether such harm is occurring.
Looking forward it is possible that increased rarity and visibility of this group 
might result in increased vulnerability and harm, but the opposite may also prove to 
be true. on the one hand it is the case, at least in very many places, that those who 
are very visibly disfigured or abnormal are in far better situations than they were in 
previous generations; following disability rights activism and regulation of the last 
half-century (shakespeare, 2006). It is not just the case that there is less discrimina-
tion permitted in certain sectors, for example, in terms of employment opportunities, 
but also that successful activism has resulted in cultural change with regard to those 
who are visibly disfigured; in the terminology of this paper abnormal. certain types 
of harm—most obviously discrimination, but also stigma and shaming—are not just 
illegal but unacceptable. This is clearly evident in terms of acceptable language and 
behaviour. This tolerance may mean that even if there is increased discrimination 
on appearance grounds this group may not suffer from it; because discrimination of 
the obviously physically disabled or disfigured is unacceptable. Indeed it might be 
the case that those who fall a long way outside the normal range might prove less 
vulnerable to harm than those who fall nearer to it. The impossibility of attaining 
normal might protect those in the abnormal group from pressures to attain appear-
ance norms all together. on the other hand it is reasonable to think that as appear-
ance matters more, the suffering of those who do not make the appearance grade will 
increase. If meeting beauty ideals becomes an increasingly valued aspect of personal 
identity and a key factor is self-esteem then not being able to meet these criteria will 
be increasingly costly with regard to identity and self-conception, as well as carry 
costs with regard to being valued in the public sphere and able to access other goods, 
such as employment. Exactly how such harms might accrue and be constituted is not 
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clear and the extent to which harms will in fact manifest requires further evidence. 
However, that this group are more visible is clear and, given this, it is not unreason-
able to think this makes them open to suffering a number of possible harms. This 
deserves both recognition and attention.
4.3 Indirect, general harms to all
The third harm is the indirect harm to all of rising standards of beauty and in-
creased engagement with beauty practices. as more is required to meet minimum 
standards more of us fall short and fail. arguably this leads to an increasingly toxic 
environment which constitutes a general harm to all. In the last section I argued that 
rising minimal standards of beauty make those who fall a long way from the normal 
range more visible and different and potentially open to harm. In this section I argue 
that rising minimal standards not only harm those who are abnormal, who can never 
meet the increasing demands of beauty, but also those who can. as more engage so 
non-engagement stands out and becomes unusual and eventually abnormal; in the 
words of susan Bordo “the ordinary body becomes the defective body” (Bordo, 1997). 
For example, it is the hairy body and non-coloured hair which are now abnormal. 
Beauty requirements are enforced by social norms and expectations, rather than by 
coercion, but nonetheless the list of beauty practices which are regarded as required 
is increasingly extensive and demanding. rising minimal standards of beauty even-
tually fall on all who are able to conform, as not conforming becomes unacceptable; a 
failure to minimally groom connotes lack of respect for the self or others and signals 
illness or distress. over time the choices of some to engage eventually mean that all 
have less choice not to engage. Thus the choices of some gradually reduce the choices 
of all.
This argument has parallels with the feminist argument discussed in 2.2; and in a 
similar manner seeks to suggest that social norms harm those who do not engage and 
potentially all. However, while there are some similarities—most importantly that the 
choices of individuals should not be considered as isolated or discrete—my claim is 
substantively different. The feminist arguments focus on the harms which arise from 
gender injustice; whether to individual women or to women as a group. Key to these 
claims is the asymmetrical and hierarchical relations between men and women and 
the difference between men and women’s engagement in beauty practices. These ar-
guments are not primarily concerned that beauty standards are increasingly demand-
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ing, although this is part of the critique, but that they are demanded of women and 
not of men. according to such theories the purpose of beauty practices is to mark 
women out, to trivialise and sexualise and to embed unequal and inferior status. My 
target is not gender disparity or inequality, but the harms which accompany the in-
creasing valuing of appearance in a visual and virtual culture and the harms which 
follow from increasing engagement in beauty practices and the accompanying rise in 
minimal standards of beauty. such rising engagement is required of all, irrespective 
of gender.
There are of course valid arguments about the gendered harms of beauty, but 
the harms which follow from rising minimal standards are not necessarily gen-
dered, nor do they derive from asymmetry between men and women. Elsewhere I 
have argued in detail that the asymmetry, or inequality to use the more familiar lan-
guage of moral and political philosophy, between genders with regard to body work 
is breaking down. Men, particularly young men, increasingly do body work and 
engage in beauty practices to attain normal or minimal standards. They also increas-
ingly suffer, as women long have, from body image anxiety, and experience pressure 
to attain body ideals which require significant time and effort and often chemical 
and/or surgical intervention.29 accordingly, for all, irrespective of gender, what is re-
quired to attain minimal standards of beauty, to be just good enough, to be normal, 
is growing. Beauty requirements are more demanding, and there is more pressure 
to attain minimal standards, and more pressure to engage beyond the minimum for 
both men and women. Moreover, and crucially for this paper, more harms attach if 
one fails to attain such minimum standards, or believes that one has failed. The types 
of harms which attach to failing in the appearance stakes, or simply to over-focusing 
on appearance, are myriad. They include harms to individuals as anxiety about body 
image and appearance increases and increasingly beauty failure is regarded as failure 
more generally. In addition there are shared and communal harms as time, effort and 
money is devoted to beauty goods in preference to other goods. This harm is a stan-
dard justice harm of opportunity cost: what could we do if we did not do this? Given 
the size of the beauty industry, taking into account the use of global resources, as well 
29.  To clarify, I argue that the inequality between men and women with regard to beauty is break-
ing down in four key ways: first, men increasingly value (male) appearance; second men increasingly 
worrying about body image; third men increasingly engage in body work; and fourth male beauty 
ideals, like female beauty ideals, are increasingly demanding and require intervention (Widdows, 
forthcoming 2018). However, significant gender differences – and harms from such gender differences 
– remain. 
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as expertise (for instance, r&d devoted to beauty which could be devoted to health), 
the collective opportunity cost is extensive.
However, while it is the case that the harms from an increasingly toxic envi-
ronment are potentially devastating to individuals and communities it is not the 
case that these harms track directly to engagement of some in beauty practices. My 
claim is not that those who engage in beauty practices are wholly responsible for the 
rising minimal standards of beauty, nor am I arguing that those who engage should 
be blamed or prohibited from engagement.30 rather, I argue that it is reasonable to 
infer that rising engagement in beauty practices is one factor which contributes to a 
culture in which beauty standards will continue to rise, and in which normal will be 
harder to attain, and in which beauty will be increasingly valued. The harms of this 
are not, or not only, to those who engage, but to others who currently do not engage 
or who only engage to reach the most minimal standards of acceptable grooming.
Tracking the causes of social and communal harm is notoriously difficult and 
verges on the impossible. undoubtedly increased engagement by some is only part 
of the picture. What is driving the increasing demands of beauty is complex and 
there are myriad reasons for increasing engagement, rising minimal standards and 
the increased value placed on appearance. reasons include the rise of a virtual and 
therefore visual culture, technological advances which make new interventions pos-
sible, the increased democratisation of beauty as practices become affordable and 
accessible, and the dominance of consumer culture which values work on the self 
and prioritises body-projects as cites of self-expression and realisation (Jones, 2008; 
Gimlin, 2002; Lazar, 2011; Tincknell, 2011). While all agree that there is an exponen-
tial rise in anxiety about body image and increased valuing of appearance attributing 
causes is complex. yet for whatever reason body image is cited as the third largest 
and most harmful challenge facing young people in the uK (after lack of employment 
opportunities and failing to succeed within the education system) (yMca, 2016). 
The literature on which factors are most important in feeding this rise in body image 
anxiety is large, contested and indeterminate.31 But, while it is not possible to track 
the extent to which each factor contributes, it is the case that appearance increas-
30.  on the contrary, I argue that rejecting beauty practices is divisive, counter-productive and is a 
failed response to the growing demands of beauty (Widdows, forthcoming 2018).
31. For example, some focus on the media, arguing that the link between idealised thinness in the 
media and body images issues is now demonstrated in many studies (Ghaznavi and Taylor, 2015). 
While others deny media influence and argue that it is the influence of family and friends which is 
primary (stice et al., 2001).
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ingly matters, particularly to the young, and, as tracking changes in beauty practices 
shows what is required to attain minimal standards is more demanding than previ-
ously. undoubtedly then, “the high prevalence of negative body image is a signifi-
cant public health concern due to its negative physical and psychological health out-
comes” (diedrichs et al., 2011).32 overall the rise in attention to beauty, engagement 
in beauty practices and rising minimal standards results in significant communal or 
general harm which falls on all. We are harmed by the creation of a toxic environ-
ment in which appearance is dominant, cosmetic surgery is normalised, and beauty is 
key to personal identity and denotes individual success and failure.
To argue that an increasingly toxic environment is emerging and that this harms 
others (all others), is not to suggest that all are harmed in the same way or to the same 
extent and some individuals may be virtually unscathed. Individuals will respond 
differently to different types of stimuli and negotiate and critique such pressures 
differently and some will be unaffected. yet the impossibility of determining causal 
links or of tracking direct impact should not mean we do not pay attention to pat-
terns and the potential harmful consequences of changing social norms and contexts. 
communal harms matter not in an abstract way but precisely because they impact on 
all by shaping and limiting what is possible for individuals to be and do.
5. coNcLusIoN
In this paper I have argued for a shift in framework in order to recognise cur-
rently neglected harms of beauty. I have argued that current discourses, especially 
those of policy-makers, ethicists and lawyers, have largely ignored harms-to-others. 
They have focused almost exclusively on the harms to those who engage beyond 
minimal standards of beauty. I argued that this is strange given the liberal assumption 
that harms-to-others should be addressed in preference to addressing harms to the 
self; as interference in self-harm is deemed wrongly paternalistic. I then turned to the 
harms-to-others which are currently omitted from the discourse surrounding beauty 
practices and I focused on three harms-to-others to illustrate the range of harms and 
the extent of such harms. The extent to which these harms-to-others are attributable 
and can be tracked differs. The first harm, to providers of beauty practices, is a direct 
32.  Negative effects which have been suggested result from body image anxiety include (amongst 
others) lower self-esteem, disordered eating behaviours and eating disorders, impaired social and oc-
cupation functioning and well as poorer day-to-day interactions and increased problems with sexual 
functioning (cash and smolak, 2011).
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harm, the second two are indirect and the extent to which engagement is causal and 
the extent of the harm is more difficult to evidence, but nonetheless such harms 
should be taken into account when considering the costs and harms of engagement 
in beauty practices.
The significance of the harm, rather than type of harm, should determine the 
extent to which policy-makers seek to intervene. The current prevalence of body 
image anxiety experienced, particularly but not only, by young people and its nega-
tive effects (increased anxiety, low self-esteem, reduced physical activity, and lower 
social and educational involvement) is of epidemic proportions.33 If these effects 
could be tracked to a physical cause, for instance the taking of a recreational drug, 
or as a side-effect of a pollutant, then such causes would immediately be targeted. 
How harms are recognised and the construction of harms fundamentally shapes 
policy responses. The classic example is the shift in the construction of the harms of 
smoking; once regarded a matter of individual freedom and choice and now regarded 
as a public health issue. a currently contested example which is increasingly regard-
ed as a public health issue is obesity; although there is still significant debate about 
the extent of justified state and policy intervention. If the same reframing happened 
with beauty, and the harm of a toxic environment which has created an epidemic of 
body image anxiety, was reframed as a public health issue, rather than a matter of 
individual choice, policy would be transformed. No longer would this be regarded 
as something individuals should be left to choose to do or not do, but harm reduc-
tion would be introduced. a host of interventions are possible, including prohibiting 
some practices (at least for some groups), regulating advertising, providing education, 
making social media accountable and so on. How effective such interventions are 
likely to be requires further research, but what intervention will work matters less 
than recognising that we should intervene. recasting beauty harms as public health 
concerns provides a reason, even a duty, to intervene. It reveals the harms which fo-
cusing only on engaging individuals obscures. admittedly targeting social causes and 
addressing communal harms is far more difficult than regulating individual choices, 
however difficulty in addressing harms should not prevent harms from being recog-
33.  There is numerous evidence to support this claim, including the yMca report (2016) and 
the annual Girlguiding survey (2016). a few statistics from the Girlguding survey are indicative: 47 
percent of girls aged 11-21 say the way they look holds them back; 40 percent of girls between 7 and 10 
think feel they should lose weight sometimes or most of the time and this rises to 80 percent of girls 
between 17 and 21; 53 percent of girls. 
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nised. Policy should focus on addressing the most significant harms not those which 
are easiest to address. Focusing on engaging others results in a skewed picture which 
makes significant and potentially devastating harms of beauty invisible.
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